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Abstract
This paper empirically examines how fiscal rules and tax autonomy influence
deficits of sub-national sectors across European countries. I use a new panel-data
set to measure tax autonomy and the stringency of fiscal rules for EU15 regional
and local government sectors over the period 1995 to 2008. I apply an instrumental
variables approach to obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of fiscal rules on
deficits. I use political variables describing the central governments characteristics
as instruments for fiscal rules at the sub-national level. The results show that
the effectiveness of fiscal rules and tax autonomy depends on the constitutional
structure. Fiscal rules decrease deficits only in unitary countries. Deficits of sub-
national sectors in federations can be avoided through tax autonomy.
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1. Introduction
The differences in the fiscal performance of sub-national governments across European countries
are widely unexplored. The explanation of a sub-national bias towards deficits by institutional
settings, such as fiscal rules and autonomy over tax instruments, is the utmost concern of the
present paper. The empirical results explain why some countries are more affected by a deficit
bias than others. Sub-national sectors in federations which have substantial autonomy over
their tax instruments have lower deficits than those which have not. This paper also shows
that only deficits in unitary countries can be avoided by tying the governments hands with
fiscal rules, while they are ineffective in federations.
Since the early 1990’s much attention has been devoted to explain why certain countries
have experienced long periods of budget deficits that accumulated in high levels of public debt
while others did not. The focus has been mainly on political and institutional factors, since
even countries with similar underlying economic conditions showed a widespread variation in
debt levels. The design of the institutions responsible for the budgetary process is considered
one major determinant of the cross-country heterogeneity in fiscal positions (among others,
see von Hagen and Harden, 1994, 1995; von Hagen, 2002, 2005; Alesina and Perotti, 1996, for
this line of argument).
Most of the literature, both theoretical and empirical, focused on the central or general
budget and national fiscal policy. Instead, the links between sub-national debts and deficits,
their institutions, and in particular the restrictions imposed on them by fiscal rules, have
not yet been explored in depth. The institutional background of the latter differs from the
former because of the crucial role that vertical relationships play between different layers
of government. This paper aims at investigating empirically the underlying forces from the
perspective of sub-national jurisdictions.
The differences in fiscal positions below the national level can be caused by a deficit bias
due to a common pool externality. Budgetary inflows may arise, to a certain extent, from a
common source in the form of transfers or grants, while budgetary outflows are targeted to
specific regions or municipalities. Often, sub-national entities have no direct influence over
the instruments generating a substantial share of their revenues. von Hagen and Eichengreen
(1996) introduced the idea of the local or regional tax base being responsible for bailout
expectations and being connected, through this channel, to the deficit bias. Indeed in a
dynamic context, they argue, budget constraints may become soft when governments are highly
dependent on revenues that are not generated by their own instruments. Sub-national decision
makers might expect, ex-ante, to be bailed out ex-post by a higher-level government if they
cause a large and unsustainable deficit. In other words, the central government cannot credibly
commit to a no-bailout policy, if the respective lower level governments have no power to
solve fiscal problems on its own. Instead, when a large proportion of sub-national revenues
comes from own tax resources, the central government may successfully persuade sub-national
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jurisdictions that, in case of excessive debt, they have to balance their budget by increasing
tax rates under their control (von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996).
A recent attempt to mitigate this time inconsistency problem of soft budget constraints
was to impose fiscal rules on sub-national governments. The idea of fiscal rules is to force
local or regional governments to act in the way the central level desires. The number of fiscal
frameworks which impose balanced budget or debt rules on lower governmental sectors has
substantially increased over the last two decades. The introduction of the Maastricht Treaty
and the Stability and Growth Pact could be seen as the turning-point in the implementation
of such rules applied to the sub-national sector.
As a first step, I analyze the reasons driving countries to adopt, keep, or strengthen their
framework of rules. This is an important task that helps overcome a potential problem of
endogeneity. Stricter rules may be adopted by governments with stronger preferences for fiscal
discipline or a severe need for consolidation. The first case could create an omitted variable
bias and the second case might create a problem of reversed causality. The first concern is
usually addressed with fixed effects. I tackle the second identification problem by using political
characteristics of the rule imposing level as instruments for the rules themselves at the lower
governmental level. They fulfill the exclusion restriction since these political variables might
have an impact on the fiscal outcome of the central level, but not on the deficits of sub-national
governments.
I use a panel-data set of the sub-national sectors of the EU15 countries, covering data
for fiscal rules, tax autonomy, and political and fiscal variables over the period 1995-2008.
Regressions of the deficits of sub-national sectors on measurements of the strictness of rules
and the discretion to tax show that the effectiveness of fiscal rules and the impact of tax
autonomy depend crucially on the constitutional structure and division of powers. Fiscal rules
work in unitary countries and not in federations. Implicit restrictions in the form of higher tax
autonomy are an effective way to constrain excessive spending for the federal countries in my
sample.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 motivates my research question by presenting
stylized facts for sub-national public finances of the EU15 countries and presents the underlying
theory and the related literature. Section 3 explains my identification strategy. Section 4
presents the data-set, and my results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
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2. Motivation and related literature
2.1. Stylized facts and theoretical background
European countries differ substantially in the level of sub-national debt which they have accu-
mulated in the past. Figure 1 shows the level of debt outstanding in 2008 as a share of GDP
in the top panel.
[Figure 1 about here]
The figure shows that a substantial part of the total debt in European countries is due to
sub-national borrowing.1 Most federal countries, and in particular Germany, show relatively
large ratios of debt to GDP. However, this measure can be misleading, since it does not
take into account the actual size of the sub-national sector. Therefore, the bottom panel
depicts the outstanding debt as a share of revenues for the same year at the sub-national
sector. Denominating fiscal variables in this way captures two important dimensions. First, it
indicates the relevance of debt in terms of the capacity to generate budgetary inflows. Second,
this measures the size of the sub-national sector as mentioned before.2 While the ranking for
federal countries remains largely the same, this illustrates further the differences in unitary
countries. Even though the Nordic countries have much larger sub-national sectors relative to
the general government sector, their debt is lower compared to countries such as Portugal or
France, which are less decentralized.
Since debts are (at least formally)3 the accumulation of deficits over time, the following
questions arise. First, why did some federal countries, such as Germany, have on average
larger deficits than other federal countries? And second, what drives the pattern of deficits
over time in the unitary countries, even though the differences in decentralization have been
taken into account? To sum it up, it is important to explore why sub-national sectors in some
countries are exposed to a larger bias towards deficits than others.
A well-established reasoning for differences in debts and deficits at any level of government
is that the respective decision makers do not fully internalize the costs of the public goods
they acquire. This is known as the common pool problem of public budgeting. Since costs
are shared by the whole population, theoretical models, as those of von Hagen and Harden
(1995), Velasco (2000), Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2009), and Krogstrup and Wyplosz
(2010), emphasize that these costs are not fully internalized by the spending claims of individual
spending ministers, in the sub-national context by members of local or regional councils. This
results in overspending, since only a small part of the additional social costs of raising the tax
1The importance of the sub-national sector from the perspective of the general government also varies
substantially. For example, the German sub-national sector accounts for almost 40% of total debt while for
Greece this share is as little as 1%.
2The actual size might be also depicted in terms of expenditures, but note that the ordering of countries
does not change if I do so.
3See von Hagen and Wolff (2006) for a discussion of creative accounting and stock-flow adjustments.
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burden are taken into account, eventually creating a problem of 1/n. The more interest groups
are involved in deciding the budget, the more fragmented the budget process becomes, and
the larger the deficit bias due to individual spending claims. This is a result of a horizontal
externality since it occurs within one government.
This point, which applies to every level of government, is supplemented by one that especially
lets sub-national governments be inclined to overspend and borrow extensively. This occurs
because several sub-national entities are grabbing for resources out of a national common pool
(von Hagen, 2005). In this case the existence of soft budget constraints creates a vertical
externality. Bordignon (2006) provides a survey of this literature. When a budget constraint
is considered to be soft, a sub-national government can increase expenditures without facing
the full additional social costs. A hard budget constraint instead makes the entity internalize
the full additional social costs, since it expects to be responsible for the consequences of its
spending plans (Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack, 2003).
This problem is of a dynamic nature: sub-national governments can accumulate unsustain-
able debt levels if they expect ex-ante that the central government might wish to bail them
out once fiscal obligations can no longer be fulfilled ex-post. In other words, sub-national gov-
ernments might expect that under certain circumstances the central government will assume
responsibility for the liabilities they accumulate. These expectations create a link between
the future behavior of a higher-level government and the fiscal policy chosen at present. One
main driving force of these expectations is intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The probabil-
ity that a sub-national entity is not responsible for its fiscal decisions taken today is higher,
the lower the share of own-source revenues is. In other words, the higher the dependency on
central governmental grants and transfers, the higher the expectation of a bailout. This is
because the central level has less room to ask for adjustments in sub-national taxes in the case
of fiscal trouble, resulting in a dynamic game between the two governments (von Hagen and
Eichengreen, 1996).
This “default-bailout game” between the central and sub-national level is formalized by
Inman (2001) and Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003). The center commits itself at the first
stage to a no-bailout policy. The sub-national level instead chooses to spend at a level where
the local marginal benefit is higher than the marginal social costs if it has a strong belief
that the commitment of the center during the first stage is not credible. Finally, the central
government has to decide whether or not to provide additional transfers to the lower level
in order to reduce the deficit there. If the center has strong incentives to do so, its actions
will be anticipated by the lower level government. The budget constraint is the softer, the
lower the costs of the center to provide additional funds compared to leaving the sub-national
government alone with its deficits.
Starting with Wildasin (1997), several papers formalized the problem in partial equilibrium
models in order to analyze the effects of different issues on the prevalence of soft budget con-
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straints (see Vigneault (2006) for an extensive overview of theoretical considerations). Wildasin
(1997) focuses on the size and structure of jurisdictions. In his model the incentives of the
central government to intervene in lower-level public finances is due to positive externalities
of local public expenditures. Since these interventions can be anticipated at the first stage,
local budget constraints are soft. The model of Goodspeed (2002) shows that a bailout forced
by incentives of a lower level government to accumulate high debt has to be paid partially
by other regions through increased taxation. Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2007) investigates the impact of
fiscal equalization schemes, and Breuille´, Madie`s, and Taugourdeau (2006) focus on the impact
of horizontal and vertical tax competition.
In order to solve the soft budget problem of time inconsistent behavior, countries charac-
terized by little revenue raising power at sub-national levels might impose more restrictions
through fiscal rules on lower level governments in order to commit the local or regional level
to fiscal discipline. Indeed, von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) show that borrowing limits are
more prevalent in countries where the share of sub-central government’s own-source resources
is small. This is because if own taxes could be adjusted, the central government could deny a
bailout.
It has been also pointed out that these incentives might be different according to the federal
organization of countries and the division of powers across governmental levels. For federal
systems, Breuille´ and Vigneault (2010) recently show that the soft budget problem can be
worse in a multi-tier system if regional governments have discretion over transfer policies. In
that case a soft budget constraint on the regional level yields even softer budget constraints
on the local level.
The present paper aims at testing three hypothesis which have been derived from the theo-
retical literature discussed above.
H1 Higher autonomy over own tax resources mitigates the deficit bias which arises from a
soft-budget problem.
H2 Fiscal rules can be an effective way to constrain sub-national sectors.
H3 The effect of the two mechanisms depends on the constitutional structure and differs
between federations and unitary countries.
This paper provides an empirical analysis of all three hypothesis.
2.2. Related empirical literature
The theoretical interest in soft budget constraints in the context of fiscal federalism has also
triggered empirical contributions in this area. Most existing studies focus either on cross-
country evidence over aggregated fiscal policy on the sub-national level, or country specific case
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studies. Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2003) provide a collection of mostly descriptive case
studies. Additional country specific evidence for sub-national bailouts is provided by von Hagen
et al. (2000) for German states, Italian regions, and Australian and Swedish local jurisdictions.4
Evidence for Sweden is found by Dahlberg and von Hagen (2004). They show that the ability
of the central Swedish government to commit to a no-bailout policy is rather weak, while the
high degree of tax autonomy at the local level helps to harden budget constraints. A recent
study by Pettersson-Lidbom (2010) identifies the expectations of local Swedish governments
over a future discretionary grant by an instrumental variable approach. He uses the grants
received by neighboring municipalities as an instrument for the anticipation of own additional
future discretionary grants. A significant soft budget effect is found, and on average debt is
increased by 20 percent when the budget constraint becomes soft. Apart from these studies,
there is not much more empirical evidence at the country level. The lack of empirical work can
be explained by the fact that expectations over the additional allocation of funds are not easy
to measure, and as shown in the various case studies, numerous aspects of intergovernmental
relations can create this effect.
Recent empirical work on fiscal rules at the general level of government across European
countries5 has established that their effectiveness depends on the institutional and political
background of the respective country. Evidence in von Hagen (2006) underpins the impor-
tance of the design of the budget process that enables the government to commit to the rule.
Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2007) show that the stringency of fiscal targets has an
impact in European countries which are characterized by ideological dispersion in the gov-
ernment. An intensive discussion of these results is provided in Hallerberg, Strauch, and von
Hagen (2009). Similar results are obtained by the study of Debrun et al. (2008), who apply
another indicator to capture the strictness of rules across European Union countries.
Empirical contributions that are closely related to this paper perform cross-country compar-
isons at the sub-national level.6 This literature focuses on the differences across countries in
order to investigate which institutional elements have an impact on sub-national fiscal policy.
Rodden (2002, 2006) uses a panel-data set of forty-three OECD, developing, and developed
countries over ten years (1986 to 1996). A first set of results is based on ten-year average
regressions, capturing long-run effects. He finds that vertical fiscal imbalance (here the share
4Among others, further contributions deal with bailouts across the German states (Seitz, 2000; Fink and
Stratmann, 2011; Baskaran, 2012), Spanish regions (Sorribas-Navarro, 2011), and various Latin American
countries (e.g. Echavarria, Renteria, and Steiner, 2002; Bevilaqua, 2002; Nicolini et al., 2002).
5For studies exploiting variation across US states see, among others, von Hagen (1991); Poterba (1994);
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995); Poterba (1996); Fata´s and Mihov (2006). Bohn and Inman (1996) find that
only constitutional rules prevent deficits in US states, while statutory ones do not. Feld and Kirchgassner
(2006) find that across Swiss cantons those with fiscal constraints have significantly lower deficits. In addition,
Alesina et al. (1999) show for a sample of Latin American countries that well designed budget institutions
reduce deficits.
6Another strand of literature deals with the overall effect of decentralization. Baskaran (2011) provides an
excellent overview.
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of grants and shared taxes in revenues) is positively related to deficits. For a second set of
results all countries are grouped in two categories, countries with high and low borrowing au-
tonomy. For the high-autonomy group he finds that vertical fiscal imbalance is still a driving
force of deficits, while there is no effect for the countries with low borrowing autonomy. As
mentioned in the conclusion of that paper, more work should be done to investigate the effects
of tax autonomy, and in particular the changes over time and the different degrees of borrowing
autonomy. Plekhanov and Singh (2007) analyze with a panel-data set over 1982-2000 which
specific institutional design of borrowing constraints prevents large sub-national deficits. Their
classification of fiscal rules is based on dummies according to the way the rules are imposed.
This paper finds, while averaging over all years for each country, that rules imposed by the
central government and cooperative agreements reduce deficits when the vertical imbalance
is large. So far, the constitutional structure of countries has not been taken into account.
Recently, Foremny and von Hagen (2013a,b) have analyzed the adjustment behavior of sub-
national sectors to negative revenue shocks and find important differences between unitary and
federal countries.
These days almost all European sub-national governments are constrained by some fiscal
restrictions. The classification into categories as in Plekhanov and Singh (2007) is not without
ambiguity. Another shortcoming of the existing empirical literature is that none of the papers
provide a panel analysis which accounts for the changes in fiscal rules and tax autonomy over
time. This is because time invariant indicators are used, and institutional changes are ne-
glected; or because some results are based on between estimations, which were carried out on
the average of the variables per country over time. Fiscal rules differ over time and how strin-
gent and transparent they are applied. In particular European countries introduced numerous
rules for sub-national sectors over the last two decades. I use a continuous index, rather than
a categorical approach, to investigate whether the strictness of rules has an impact.
Similar arguments apply to the characterization of own-source revenues. The concept of
vertical fiscal imbalance should be taken into account carefully, since sometimes it has not
been considered that shared taxes are eventually not very different from grants. Tax rates
cannot be decided individually at the sub-national level. To improve on this, I focus on the
development of own-source taxes. This takes into account the distortionary nature of taxes,
when central governments ask for adjustments by increasing tax rates rather than providing
additional funds through bailouts or by increasing grants. This is even more important since
the underlying problem of soft budget constraints is a dynamic one. Solving these issues is one
of the main contributions of this paper. I estimate panel models where I carefully construct
measures of the tax autonomy of sub-national sectors, the different strength of borrowing
restrictions in the form of fiscal rules, and explicitly take into account the variation over time.
This can be interpreted as comparing the outcome for times before major reforms of rules and
tax autonomy were implemented with the time after their implementation.
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A further well known problem in the literature on fiscal rules is that their correlation with
deficits does not necessarily have to be causal. Studies on the national level have highlighted
the lack of good quality instruments in order to address a problem of endogeneity. The explicit
sub-national context instead allows finding variables that are correlated with the fiscal rules
index, but are orthogonal to the error term. I exploit the fact that fiscal rules in the EU15
are in almost all cases imposed by a higher level of government. Earlier contributions have
shown that political economy variables are able to explain the stringency of fiscal rules (see
Debrun et al. (2008), for instance). However, on the national level these variables might not
be simultaneously uncorrelated with budgetary outcomes. In the case of sub-national sectors
instead the decision makers over rules (the central government) and the decision makers over
budgetary policy (the sub-national entities) are not the same. I will make use of the fact that
the characteristics of central governments, which impose rules on the sub-national one, are
unlikely to be correlated with their budgetary outcomes, but describe well the prevalence of
rules. My identification approach is described in the next section.
3. Identification
The main objective of this paper is to analyze if the budgetary position can be explained by
autonomy over taxation and fiscal rules. I estimate a reduced form model of a fiscal reaction
function according to equation (1):
Di,t = γΦ′taxi,t−1 + δΦ′rulesi,t + βXi,t + µi + ηt + εi,t (1)
The dependent variable is a measure of the budget deficit, Di,t, at the sub-national level. The
impact of the tax-structure in terms of sub-national autonomy is captured by the parameter
γ. A negative and significant effect would confirm hypothesis H1. I estimate the reaction to a
lagged variable of the share of taxes which are under discretion of the respective government.
Using the one period lag is important since policy makers will use their information from the
past to build their expectations about the future. A high dependency on own-source taxes in
the past indicates that it is likely that current deficits must be paid back by own resources
instead of expecting to receive transfers from the central government. The parameter δ captures
the impact of fiscal rules, and a negative and significant effect would confirm H2. The data
section explains in detail how the variables tax and rules are constructed.
The impact of other control variables is measured by the parameters in the vector β. µi
and ηt are individual and time fixed effects. The inclusion of individual fixed effects is, besides
capturing unobserved heterogeneity, important to focus on the dynamic nature of the under-
lying problem. I aim at an estimate of the impact of changes in the institutional framework
on budgetary outcomes in the form of annual deficits. Hence, the question is how rules and
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autonomy affect deficits in the short run, and the fixed effects capture all time invariant factors,
including preferences for sound fiscal policy.
It is important to take the connection of the sub-national level to the higher level of gov-
ernment into account. The mechanism to tie the hands of lower-level governments by granting
more autonomy might work in federations, where lower-level governments have substantial
degrees of freedom over their policies and legal acts. On the contrary, in unitary countries
the sub-national level sometimes can be seen as an extension of central government policies.
When the sub-national level is not much more than a branch of the central one, a credible
commitment of the center to a no-bailout strategy might be impossible in any case (even in
line with a positive impact of autonomy on deficits). To capture these effects, the two main
variables of interest in Equation 1 are interacted with a set of dummy variables:
Φ′ =
 Φ1
Φ2
 and = 1 if unitary country, 0 otherwise
= 1 if local or regional level in a federal country, else 0
The dummy variables classify the respective form of government.7 Doing so allows to estimate
separate coefficients on tax autonomy and fiscal rules for federal and unitary countries. If
slopes turn out to be different, hypothesis H3 will be confirmed.
The possibility that fiscal rules are the result of, rather than the reason for fiscal performance,
requires a careful analysis of causality. I use an instrumental variable approach to overcome this
hurdle. I estimate the factors determining the fiscal rules index. I include political determinants
of the level of government which is implementing the rules, indicators of the general fiscal stance
of the respective country, as well as dummies for different time periods (the time of the Stability
and Growth Pact, for instance) and further controls, included in Z, into the model.
First, as shown in Equation (2), I estimate a model for each value of the fiscal rules index
j across countries, using the average of covariates during the time span when the rule was in
force:
rulesj = γpolj + δbudgetj + θtimej + βZj + εj (2)
Second, I estimate conventional fixed effects models to capture the variance in rules over time
according to the model in Equation (3):
rulesi,t = γpoli,t + δbudgeti,t + θtimei,t + βZi,t + µi + εi,t (3)
Ideally, this step offers candidates for instruments which I can use for an unbiased estimation
of the impact of fiscal rules on budgetary outcomes. I re-estimate Equation (1) and use the
variables which are found to be correlated with the rules index to instrument this variable in
7Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Spain are treated as federations. Please refer to Table 7 in the Appendix
A for details of the classification.
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equation (1). I report results from 2-stage least-squares estimations but I also apply Difference-
GMM (i.e. Arellano and Bond, 1991) in order to estimate dynamic models including a lagged
dependent variable among the regressors.
This identification procedure corrects some drawbacks of former empirical approaches. First,
the focus on the within variance with time-varying indicators allows identification of the effects
in the short run. Second, including the lagged value of tax autonomy creates a better reflection
that decision makers form their expectations by observed values from the previous period. Last,
the proper choice of instruments can eliminate a potential problem of reversed causality.
4. Data
This study is using aggregate data for sub-national sectors. All EU15 members are included
over a period ranging from 1995 to 2008.8 I include regional and local governments as separate
entities for four federal organized member states. This provides 19 observations per year and
266 in total over the fourteen years covered by my data set.9
4.1. Dependent variable and indicators of fiscal rules and tax
autonomy
The dependent variable is a measure of the budgetary position in each year. I use annual
deficits, either denominated by GDP or by sub-national total revenues as the main dependent
variables. Defining the dependent variable as share of revenues measures differences in capa-
bilities to raise government income and relates the size of deficits to the actual capacity of the
sub-national sector. This is the relevant measure from the perspective of a sub-national entity
and has been used in the previous literature. A measure denominated by GDP is appropriate
for a general government perspective. I report results for both variables for comparison.
Two indicators have to be computed to investigate the effects of fiscal rules and tax autonomy.
I construct both indicators as a time-varying index that captures the development for each
country over the entire time period.
First, an indicator of tax autonomy is needed to test whether the dependency on own tax
resources creates incentives to balance the books. I compute an indicator of the share of
own-source tax revenues in total revenues at each governmental level. The classification of
8The choice of this period is mostly the result of data restrictions as years prior to 1995 are not available
and more recent years are often subject to revision by EUROSTAT. Furthermore, some data for the IV strategy
is not available after 2008. However, in Foremny and von Hagen (2013b) we focus on the cyclicality of sub-
national rules and expand the sample up to 2010. We cannot apply the IV strategy due to the above-mentioned
data limitations. That paper re-estimates the baseline model by OLS for comparison. Results for the sample
including two more years remain unchanged.
9Please refer to Appendix D for robustness checks on alternative sample designs. Main results remain
unchanged.
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own-source revenues is, unfortunately, not straightforward. Other studies rely on the degree
of vertical imbalance or the share of taxes in total revenues, which can be misleading.10 It
is important to distinguish real own-source revenues from those revenues arising due to tax-
sharing arrangements, i.e. taxes collected by a higher level and automatically transferred to
the lower one. The OECD (1999) provides a classification of the taxing power of sub-national
levels. Unfortunately, their Fiscal Decentralization Database provides only information for two
or at most three years, 1995, 2002, and 2005. I use the Revenue Statistics of the OECD,
the Taxes in Europe database of the European Commission, numerous national sources over
changes in tax-systems, and the information provided by Stegarescu (2005) to construct a
comparable indicator over the entire 14 years of the sample. I treat all taxes over which either
discretion on rates, reliefs, or both are under the power of the sub-national entity as own-source
tax revenues. This measure does not overestimate the revenue autonomy in the presence of
shared taxes.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of this indicator. The Nordic countries are char-
acterized by the largest share of autonomous revenues while German states, both Austrian
sectors, Ireland, and the Netherlands have on average very little discretion over their revenues.
Variation in the indicator is generated by two different effects. On the one hand, the tax-
system can be changed, equipping lower level governments with a richer set of instruments or
more autonomy over existing taxes. Some governmental sectors, such as the Spanish regions
and the sub-national Italian sector have implemented considerable changes within this period.
On the other hand, the share of other revenues could also shift when the center re-allocates
resources to lower levels of government. A value of zero indicates that all available revenues are
either grants or transfers from other levels of government while a value of 1 indicates that the
sub-national sector has full discretion over taxes which cover all their revenues. An increasing
value of this indicator represents a lower dependency on transfers at the sub-national level and,
according to H1, might help to avoid soft budget constraints.
Second, I construct another indicator to depict the strength of fiscal rules, i.e. how stringent
borrowing is regulated. Fiscal rules are nowadays frequently used at the sub-national level in
European countries (European Commission, 2009, 2008, 2006; Sutherland, Price, and Joumard,
2005) to mitigate a deficit bias and to harden the budget constraint by imposing numerical
targets on budgetary variables or limiting the access to credits. I use the data provided by the
European Commission (2009) to create an index of the strictness of rules. All fiscal rules which
have an impact on the fiscal balance are included in the calculation of the index: balanced-
budget-rules, debt brakes, and other direct restrictions on borrowing.11 The original EU index
10A good example are German federal states. Their share of tax revenues in total revenues is substantial,
but the share of real own-source taxes is close to zero since they cannot decide on an individual tax rate.
11Expenditure ceilings are very rare at the sub-national level and, as in the original EU variable, excluded
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is adjusted to the situation of sub-national levels. In the non-federal countries, an average
of the rules applying to different levels, weighted by their share of expenditures in the total
sub-national budget, is used. The indicator is forced to vary between 0 (in the case if no fiscal
rule is applied) and 1 (in the case of the strictest rule during the period).12
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 shows the development of this indicator. The restrictions are relatively stable over
time in one group of countries (Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, and Finland) while an-
other group (Austria, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden) has increased the strictness
of rules in recent years. Most countries introduced national stability pacts as an answer to
the limitations arising from European supranational rules.13 A third group (Greece, Luxem-
burg, The Netherlands, and The United Kingdom) goes without strict rules. When these
fiscal arrangements work as an effective tool to dampen a deficit bias, a negative coefficient is
expected.
4.2. Control variables
The other controls are summarized in Table 1. The fiscal position of the central government
def cg rev is included to capture a copycat effect. Sub-national governments that observe a
loose fiscal policy at the national level can follow the example given by the central government,
expecting that they are not sanctioned if the higher level is profligate as well.
[Table 1 about here]
The degree of decentralization is taken into account by the share of sub-national expenditures
in general government expenditures edec. Unfortunately, this indicator is not able to distin-
guish between expenditures that could be categorized as compulsory or those that are optional
to provide. Nevertheless, the share of expenditures captures the weight of the sub-national
sector in the general budget and how spending proportions are shared between the govern-
mental levels. These shares differ across European countries, with varying responsibilities and
discretion over their exercises.
[Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 shows the country means over my period of study. The Nordic countries are character-
ized by a high level of services and responsibilities on the local level. Danish sub-national gov-
ernments spend on average more than every second Danske kroner, followed by their Swedish
and Finnish neighbors. The regional levels of Belgium, Spain, and Germany are responsible
for the main analysis of the impact of rules on deficits.
12The construction of this index is described in detail in Appendix C.
13For example, the change in the rule index in 2001 in Austria is due to the Oesterreichischer Stabilitaetspakt
and the change in the same year in Italy can be explained by the Patto di stabilita´ interno.
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for approximately one quarter of total expenditures, accompanied by their local governments
with additional, but lower expenditure shares. The less decentralized countries are France,
Portugal, Luxembourg, and Greece. The plot against the average of own-source tax revenues
indicates that in many cases higher expenditure decentralization is accompanied by a higher
degree of autonomy over tax revenues. As noted before, this is not the case for some countries,
in particular not for the German federal states and for Austria, Ireland, and the Netherlands.
Additional covariates are included to capture cyclical and institutional effects and to con-
sider the spending needs of lower-level governments. I include the output gap outgap, the
unemployment rate unempl, the ratio of the working age to total population depratio, and in-
terest expenses intexp rev. All fiscal variables are computed as shares of revenues. Population
Ipopulation enters in logs and is denominated by the maximum value of the sample to facilitate
interpretation (see Neyapti (2010) for a similar transformation).
4.3. Political variables
Whereas national fiscal rules are often self imposed, nation-wide rules for sub-national sectors
are not. Usually they are imposed by the central level, and institutional and political variables
of that level have an impact on the strictness of the rules which are implemented over time.
Even though one can argue that in federal countries the regional level could impose rules on
the local one, this has not been observed over the last decades. The new fiscal frameworks
in Spain and Austria for instance were both imposed on all sub-national levels by the central
government.14
Table 2 summarizes the political variables, which I take into account for the estimation of
fiscal rules themselves. The motivation for the central government to impose restrictions on
lower level governments could be determined by the perception that a soft budget problem
is at hand. Thus, the federal structure itself plays a role and several determinants of the
deficit might also be crucial for the strictness of rules. These issues are taken into account
by using some of the variables already discussed. This, being interesting by itself, would
unfortunately not provide valid instruments as those variables have to be included directly in
the deficit estimation. However, the central level itself must also believe that fiscal rules are
a mean to cure the problem and must be able to implement the rules through the legislature.
Political variables which characterize the central government and its preferences might be
related to fiscal rules. Most of the data is obtained from the World Bank Database of Political
Institutions 2009 (Beck et al., 2001).
14Self-imposed rules of particular regional governments and their local counterparts are a somewhat new
phenomenon. The sample in this paper covers data up to 2008, and none of the rules taken into account are self
imposed by a regional level or imposed by that level on the local government sector. However, some regions or
cities may have additional self-imposed restrictions. As data is aggregated for sub-national sectors, this is not
explicitly taken into account in my analysis. This issue has been recently addressed by Brooks, Halberstam,
and Phillips (2013) but is beyond the scope of the present paper.
14
[Table 2 about here]
First, to control if the ideological orientation of the government plays a role, an index over the
two main government parties, reaching from zero (left-wing, single party government) to one
(right-wing, single party government), is calculated. There is no general conjecture over the
direction of the impact of this variable, and the sign could point in either direction.15
Second, the Herfindahl index measures the fractionalization of the ruling coalition. A single
party government yields a value of one, while values close to zero indicate a more dispersed
government. The index can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly picked mem-
bers of the ruling coalition belong to the same party. The expected sign of this variable is not
clear. On the one hand, a more fragmented government could be willing to restrict lower lev-
els, because they are able to blame other coalition members when local or regional politicians
complain about new rules. On the other hand, a less fragmented government might find it
easier to pass new rules through the legislature.
Third, the district magnitude measures the average number of seats in the parliament per
electoral district. Beside the impact on the effective number of parties,16 the district magnitude
might have an additional impact in the sub-national context. A higher value indicates that
more seats are allocated within one electoral district. Hence, the connection between local
politics and the politicians elected into the central parliament might be loose. On the contrary,
a small district magnitude means that the representative in the central legislature could be
seen as directly responsible for the respective district. A strong connection to the sub-national
level might cause representatives to be cautious with imposing strict rules, because they do
not want to cross with local politicians and voters.
Last, I include the predicted form of fiscal governance, according to von Hagen and Harden
(1995), Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2007), and Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen
(2009). This literature characterizes whether a delegation or contract approach of fiscal gov-
ernance is appropriate for different countries. Centralizing the budget process could be done
by the former approach by delegating authority to one member of the executive that is vested
with special strategic power. On the national level the finance minister is typically in charge
of this special function. The contract approach instead relies on agreements between all mem-
bers of the cabinet with spending rights. I include the indicator developed in this literature to
investigate whether central governments that are assumed to be contract countries follow this
approach when designing rules for sub-national levels.
Conditional on the results some of these variables could be used to instrument the fiscal
rules index as they do not have to be included into the deficit estimation itself (they fulfill
the exclusion restriction) but may explain the strictness of the fiscal framework (are highly
15Debrun et al. (2008) report evidence that more conservative orientated governments make less use of fiscal
rules.
16The idea was developed by Duverger (1954), tested empirically by Taagepera and Shugart (1993) and put
in the context of budgetary politics by Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999).
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correlated with fiscal rules).
5. Results
5.1. The political economy of sub-national fiscal rules
This section explores which factors induce a higher reliance on rules, and which circumstances
trigger the adoption of rules.17
[Table 3 about here]
The first column of Table 3 presents the results from an OLS regression according to Equation
(2) of each single outcome of the fiscal rules index on the average values over the period in
which one set of rules was in force in a given country.18 In other words, each value of the fiscal
rules index appearing in a country is regressed on the average values of all other covariates
during that time. This simple approach reveals interesting insights, at which I look with more
sophisticated methods according to Equation (3) in columns (b) to (d). The first two remaining
models (b and c) provide evidence from a pooled model, and the last (d) shows results from a
fixed effect estimation. Model (c) includes the lagged value of the rules index to account for
the persistence of this variable.
The top panel of the table shows the impact of political variables on the rules index. The first
variable herfgov is significant and negative in almost all specifications, except the dynamic one
in model (c). A government which consists of a single party or of one big and one small coalition
member, represented by a higher value of the Herfindahl fractionalization index (i.e. a less
fractionalized one), tends to impose less strict rules. One-party governments might receive more
leeway from their sub-national counterparts and might try to avoid this conflict. Countries that
are supposed to follow a contract approach of fiscal governance at the central level (Hallerberg,
Strauch, and von Hagen, 2009) impose less strict rules on their sub-national governments. The
district magnitude also becomes significant and positive in the panel specification.19 This
supports the view that rather loose connections to lower level politics increase the use of fiscal
rules at the sub-national level.
None of the other political variables, and neither budgetary ones, have an impact on the
rules themselves. It is important to note that this implies that sub-national deficits do not
have a feedback effect on rules. The only budgetary variable which is significant in at least
17The hurried reader who is only interested in the results for budgetary outcomes can skip this section and
continue in Section 5.2
18The interpretation of dummies that vary over time such as elections or the stability and growth pact are
in this estimation an indicator over the relative number of events in the respective time span. For example,
sgp takes the value 0.6 if the rules was valid during 6 years of the Stability and Growth Pact.
19Due to the little within variance, I check whether this result is robust when I include time dummies. The
parameter is still significant at the same level.
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one specification is the lagged debt level of the general government in the panel specification
(d). Central governments impose restrictions when general fiscal stress is at hand, but do not
react to deficits at the sub-national level.
In terms of timing, the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact has (from 1999 on-
wards) increased the strength of rules. This effect is not surprising since most national stability
pacts were introduced as an answer to the supranational European fiscal framework in order
to force the lower level governments not to counteract central level fiscal policies. Also not
surprising is that rules increase over time, as indicated by the included linear trend. Out of the
other control variables only the demographic structure, the population size, the sub-national
tax autonomy, and unemployment have an increasing impact on the implementation of fiscal
rules.
To sum up, the fractionalization of the government in power, the district magnitude, and
the predicted form of fiscal governance determine the strictness of sub-national fiscal rules.
Ideology of the central government and national elections instead do not. Neither do the bud-
getary variables, beside the lagged overall level of debt, as long as a static model is estimated.
However, constituencies in federal countries, as indicated by the two dummies against the base
group of unitary countries20, rely more on rules than their non federal counterparts. This
indicates that the political actions of the center to implement rules in unitary and federal
countries might be different. In particular, the timing when the center implements rules, and
whether the present or lagged political variables matter, may differ as the ultimate results have
suggested.
[Table 4 about here]
The estimations presented in Table 4 show that this is indeed the case. Model (a) to (e) include
separate coefficients for federations and unitary states as well as their one period lag for one
of the political variables per estimated equation. For example, column (a) shows a regression
with four different coefficients for the impact of the Herfindahl index on rules: the current
value of federal countries, the lagged value of federal countries, the current value of unitary
countries, and finally the lagged value for this group. Models (b) to (e) continue with this
procedure for the other covariates. Column (f) shows the estimates of the full model, including
lagged and current values of all variables simultaneously.
Model (a) shows that it is rather the one period lag than the current value of the Herfindahl
index which matters. Furthermore, it can be seen that federal countries do not follow the
direction described above. In this case there is a positive relationship, indicating that less
fractionalization is associated with stricter rules. In federal countries the central government
might impose those stricter rules in order to tie the hands of sub-national politicians, which
might belong to a different party. An ideological position of central governments which is con-
trary to the majority of sub-national ones is a frequently observed feature in federal countries.
20Note that this variable is omitted in the panel model as it is time invariant.
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Surprisingly ideology is now marginal significant at the 90% level for unitary countries when
the lags of all variables are included in the model as shown in (f). Election year effects (b)
instead are still not observable. As for fractionalization, also the district magnitude seems to
be more important one period lagged for unitary countries, but according to estimation (d)
and (f) signs do not change. A higher value of this variable is still increasing the rules index.
The contract approach in central governments’ fiscal policy instead is different for both types
of countries with respect to the timing. For the federal ones the actual one is significant and
negative, while for the unitary states the one period lagged value matters.
5.2. The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy on deficits
5.2.1. Baseline estimations
Table 5 presents the results of the regressions for budgetary outcomes. The dependent variable
in any model included in this table is defined as the annual sub-national deficit as a share
of of GDP. Positive values arise if expenditures exceed revenues and all coefficients with a
negative sign improve the budget balance by reducing deficits. All models include fixed effects
at the observational and year level. Including fixed effects is important in this context to
exploit the variation within groups over time and to capture time-invariant preferences for fiscal
sustainability. In addition, an F-test (F(18,216)=6.36, p-value 0.00) indicates that significant
individual effects are at present and pooled estimations are not efficient. Baltagi (2005) test
of poolability rejects the null of excluding fixed effects. (LR χ2(20)=114.90, p-value=0.00)21
[Table 5 about here]
The first column (a) shows results from panel regressions according to Equation (1) which
does not distinguish between unitary and federal countries. I find no significant effects of the
strength of fiscal rules when I do not allow for different slopes for federations and unitary
countries. Lagged tax autonomy turns out to be significant and negative in this model. A
Baltagi (2005) test of the poolability22 of the two groups and the estimation of one slope
parameter only clearly rejects (LR χ2(2)=11.39, p-value=0.00) this model against the alternative
specification with different slopes as in models (b) to (d).23 This is a first confirmation of
hypothesis H3.
The remaining models take account of this by allowing for different slopes. The results of
model (b) reveal that the impact of tax autonomy is limited to federal countries (i.e. H1
can be verified for this group). At the same time fiscal rules turn out significant in unitary
21A Hausman test rejects the appropriateness of a random effects model (χ2(12)=39.00, p-value=0.02)
22I thank the anonymous referee for suggesting to test for poolability.
23A similar test confirms this specification and rejects a model which also differentiates between local and
regional levels of federations (LR χ2(2)=1.33, p-value=0.51). Please note that this differentiation cannot be
made in unitary countries as only data for the entire sub-national sector is available.
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countries (i.e. H2 can be verified for this group). According to the hypothesis of soft budget
constraints, sub-national governments in federations run lower deficits when their share of own-
source tax revenues in the previous year has been a relatively large share of total sub-national
revenues. Given an increase in the share of revenues directly at their hands, it is perceived that
these own generated revenues also have to be used for potential future liabilities, causing lower
present deficits. Sub-national sectors in unitary countries instead show up with an opposing
behavior. These governments might anticipate that they are more or less the extension of the
central government and giving them more autonomy does not constrain them sufficiently from
profligate spending. Results are different for sub-national sectors of unitary countries. They
can be constrained by stricter fiscal rules: according to model (b) of Table 5 they overspend
less when fiscal rules are stricter and the access to borrowing is limited. In this case, fiscal
rules are an effective tool to mitigate a deficit bias, although tax autonomy is not. This does
not hold true for federally organized states, where in no specification a significant coefficient
is detected.
5.2.2. Instrumental variables estimations and Dynamic GMM
The previous estimates might be biased as fiscal rules could be endogenous. In what follows
I use an instrumental variables approach to achieve unbiased estimation results. To do so,
variables that satisfy the two properties of valid instruments, namely being uncorrelated with
the error of the regression of Equation (1), but highly correlated with the rules index, must be
found. This is usually regarded as a complicated task: explanations for the prevalence of fiscal
institutions, for instance political variables which reflect preferences, might be simultaneously
connected to the result of fiscal policy. This would imply that they are correlated with the
variable that captures fiscal rules, but also with the error term.
The context of sub-national budgetary outcomes instead offers a convenient feature to tackle
this hurdle. Rules and institutions for lower level governments are introduced by a higher
level of government. The characteristics that drive the introduction of the rules, as worked
out in Section 5.1, are correlated with the rules itself (and might be correlated with the
budgetary outcomes of that higher governmental level), but not with the budgetary position
of the governments where the rules are imposed on. The previous section has shown that
political characteristics of the central government are indeed related to the strictness of rules.
In addition, there was no feedback effect of deficits, which excludes that central governments
introduce rules when sub-national deficits are regarded as unsustainable. Hence, there are
possible candidates for a set of instruments which are correlated with the endogenous fiscal
rules variables, but are not correlated with the error term in the explanatory equation. In
other words, those variables are in line with the exclusion restriction in instrumental variable
regressions. While including fixed effects might sufficiently control for preferences for sound
fiscal policy (see Iara and Wolff (2011) for a discussion of this), this IV strategy ensures that
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there is no issue of reversed causality.
I use the variables which are, according to the previous section, found to be correlated
with the fiscal rules index as instruments. These are current values and the one-period lag of
the interacted district magnitude, the form of fiscal governance, and the Herfindahl index of
government fractionalization.24 The results of a two-sage least squares regression are reported
as model (c) of Table 5.25 Specification tests confirm this model choice as a Hansen-test rejects
overidentification and the Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic rejects weak identification.
The absolute value of the coefficient on fiscal rules in unitary countries is now approximately
more than twice as large as before. This indicates that the earlier estimate was biased towards
zero. In terms of significance both models make the same predictions, and surprisingly also
tax autonomy in unitary countries is gaining significance. The positive coefficient, however,
indicates that higher autonomy in this group of countries does not work as a limitation but
rather as an augmentation for deficits. This effects vanishes when I estimate the model by
GMM including the one period lag of the dependent variable. This model (d) confirms the
baseline results for tax autonomy and fiscal rules, as the former is still significant for the
federations in the sample and the latter for the group of unitary countries.
The other significant covariates are in line with expectations. Countries that are more
decentralized in terms of expenditure shares run on average higher deficits. Demographic
changes reveal two interesting insights. First, when the total population grows, so do deficits.
Local services are often connected to the number of people that call for them; hence more
people represent larger spending needs. Second, when the share of the working population
grows in terms of the dependency ratio, budgetary positions improve. All other variables do
not have an impact on deficits which is significantly different from zero in any model.
5.2.3. Discussion
From the perspective of the sub-national sector the deficit as a share of revenues or in per-
capita values might be a more relevant indicator than the share of GDP. For example, the
Spanish fiscal rule is defined in this way as the level of accumulated short run debt has to
be below 15% of current revenues of the previous fiscal year. Table 6 repeats the static IV
and dynamic GMM estimation with deficits as a share of sub-national revenues or per-capita
deficits as dependent variables. The share of sub-national revenues (or expenditures) has been
used previously in this line of research26 as this measure relates the deficit to sub-national
financial capacities.
24A detailed analysis of the choice of instruments can be found in the working paper version of this paper
available as Foremny (2011). Note that none of the performed robustness checks in that version of the paper
generated results different from those I present in the present paper.
25I report the first stage estimations for this regression in Appendix B.
26Among others, e.g. Rodden (2002); Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2003); Plekhanov and Singh (2007).
See Eichler and Hofmann (2013) for an overview of specifications.
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[Table 3 about here]
The results for deficits as a share of revenues are in line with those of Rodden (2002) and
Plekhanov and Singh (2007) and confirm the results from the previous section. More autonomy
over revenues generated by own-source taxation is an implicit tool to constraint sub-national
governments in federal organized countries. Interestingly, per-capita deficits to do not react
to fiscal rules in the dynamic specification. In the sense of an placebo test this confirms the
appropriateness of the fiscal rules indicator as rules usually don’t define the targets which have
to be met in per-capita terms.
These results are encouraging for policy makers. Figure 5 depicts the marginal effect of
stricter rules in unitary countries in the top panel (a) and the effect of tax autonomy in
federations in the bottom panel (b). The bars on the left show the actual value of the fiscal
rules index and tax autonomy in the year 2008 across countries. Significant improvements
of budgetary positions are potentially feasible through reforms of rule frameworks and the
structure of tax systems. This is particularly true for countries which currently make little use
of those mechanisms. If, for example, the UK would reach the value of the Irish rules index
the annual share of deficits in revenues could on average be reduced by 2.7 percent, ceteris
paribus. Some countries also would substantially benefit from more tax autonomy. The lower
panel shows that if German states would have similar taxing power than Spanish regions, the
model would predict a reduction of 7.5 percent of deficits, ceteris paribus. As a central policy
recommendation, reforms of the institutional framework can reduce deficits if implemented in
the right way.
A last open question is if these two instruments work in isolation or if there is an interplay
between the two. To check for this, I re-estimate the model and allow for interaction between
the fiscal rules index and tax autonomy.27
[Figure 6 about here]
The top panel (a) in Figure 6 shows a plot of the marginal effect of fiscal rules in unitary
countries. The interaction term is not significant in this case (cf. Table 8 in the Appendix).
The negative impact on deficits remains similar in terms of magnitude when tax autonomy
varies.
Tax autonomy itself was identified as the proper tool for federal countries. The marginal
effect in this case is depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 6. Here the interaction term is
significant (p-value=0.03, cf. Table 8 in the Appendix) and the figure shows that this tool
becomes more effective when fiscal rules are tighter. That is, even though rules themselves do
not help, an increase in tax autonomy should be considered together with the rules framework.
In the policy arena, these results and in particular the fact that the effectiveness of tools to
27Estimates are shown in Table 8 of Appendix B.
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restrict deficits depends on the countries’ constitutional structure should be carefully taken
into consideration when reforms of institutions are designed and implemented.
6. Conclusion
The main goal of this paper is to explore which institutional arrangements help to keep the
books of sub-national governments in balance. I focused on two different mechanisms which
restrain sub-national jurisdictions from fiscal profligacy. On the one hand, I investigate the role
of own sub-national tax resources, as higher bailout expectations due to less autonomy creates
incentives to run deficits. On the other hand, I study the impact of fiscal rules, which central
governments might impose to restrict the discretionary power of sub-national governments.
I conclude that a properly designed framework of fiscal rules is effective in unitary countries,
but not necessarily in federations, where the larger legal autonomy of sub-national jurisdictions
limits the effectiveness of the rules. For federal countries, I show that higher autonomy over
tax instruments is key to prevent large deficits at the sub-national level as a form of market-
preserving federalism (Weingast, 1995). My findings show that the proper choice of fiscal
arrangements depends critically on the type of government and the constitutional structure.
This complements the literature of fiscal rules on the general government level, where the
political environment and the electoral system, for instance, are important determinants for
the effectiveness of fiscal rules (Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen, 2007). As a result, a
suitable framework needs to be tailored to the characteristics of a specific country. More
stringent rules do not always result in more desirable outcomes and neither does a general
restriction of tax autonomy.
This paper is a further step in sub-national public finance in order to explore how deficits
could be avoided and large debts prevented. Several issues are left for future research. The next
step should be to make use of disaggregated data for several European countries. This allows
investigating additional effects which occur horizontally within the sub-national governments
in combination with the vertical dimension between governmental levels, as explored in this
paper. Another interesting point is the recent introduction of self-imposed fiscal rules in some
regions of federal countries. Federations often grant autonomy to sub-national governments
which allows them to adopt rules by themselves. Since self-imposed rules might be an important
signal to the markets and reflect the preferences of voters, effects might differ from those of
centrally imposed rules in federations. The evaluation of the effectiveness is an interesting task
for future research.
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Figure 1: Sub-national outstanding debt
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Figure 2: Revenues from own-source taxation
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Figure 3: Fiscal rules index
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Figure 4: Decentralization over 1995-2008
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Variable Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
deficit/revenues Eurostat overall 0.006 0.034 -0.100 0.112
between 0.022 -0.042 0.062
within 0.026 -0.087 0.101
deficit/gdp Eurostat overall 0.001 0.004 -0.013 0.016
between 0.003 -0.002 0.008
within 0.003 -0.014 0.012
Tax autonomy
tax1 OECD, overall 0.227 0.172 0.000 0.646
own calculations between 0.173 0.003 0.625
within 0.037 0.061 0.370
tax ∗ federal overall 0.152 0.122 0.000 0.343
tax ∗ unitary overall 0.281 0.184 0.041 0.646
Fiscal rules
rules2 EC, overall 0.358 0.228 0.000 1.000
own calculations between 0.242 0.000 0.857
within 0.146 -0.011 0.826
rules ∗ federal overall 0.229 0.304 0.000 1.000
rules ∗ unitary overall 0.128 0.210 0.000 0.785
Controls
def cg rev3 Eurostat overall 0.081 0.113 -0.189 0.621
between 0.074 -0.031 0.276
within 0.087 -0.169 0.556
edec4 Eurostat overall 0.254 0.131 0.043 0.659
between 0.131 0.054 0.598
within 0.029 0.116 0.360
intexp rev5 Eurostat overall 0.942 1.307 0.004 5.875
between 1.303 0.007 5.382
within 0.306 0.042 2.256
outgap Eurostat overall 0.374 1.648 -4.707 5.209
between 0.372 -0.111 1.429
within 1.608 -4.540 5.376
Ipopulation Eurostat overall 0.905 0.071 0.708 1.000
between 0.073 0.713 1.000
within 0.002 0.900 0.911
depratio6 Eurostat overall 0.670 0.012 0.636 0.690
between 0.011 0.646 0.685
within 0.006 0.640 0.687
unempl7 Eurostat overall 0.075 0.031 0.019 0.184
between 0.027 0.034 0.123
within 0.017 0.036 0.137
N=19, T=14 (1995-2008), n=266
Definitions: 1revenues from own-source taxes as share of total revenues; 2fiscal rules index; 3central government
deficit as share of revenues; 4 share of sub-national expenditures in general government expenditures; 5 interest
expenditures as share of revenues; 6 share of working population in total population; 7unemployment rate
Table 1: Summary statistics: Deficit estimation
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Variable Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ideology1 World Bank, overall 0.376 0.327 0.000 1.000
own calculations between 0.131 0.089 0.589
Beck et al. (2001) within 0.301 -0.213 1.171
herfgov2 World Bank overall 0.666 0.270 0.181 1.000
Beck et al. (2001) between 0.257 0.221 1.000
within 0.101 0.350 1.004
disctrict3 World Bank overall 9.402 6.050 1.000 22.500
Beck et al. (2001) between 5.712 1.000 20.300
within 2.364 5.052 25.352
contract4 Hallerberg et al. (2009) overall 0.425 0.495 0.000 1.000
between 0.465 0.000 1.000
within 0.199 0.068 1.282
debt gg gdp5 Eurostat overall 0.634 0.265 0.061 1.304
between 0.255 0.071 1.102
within 0.091 0.406 1.019
N=19, T=14 (1995-2008), n=266
Definitions: 1index from zero (single party left-wing) to one (single party right-wing); 2Herfindahl measure
of fractionalization (probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to the same political group);
3district magnitude; 4 form of fiscal governance; 5debt at the general government level as share of gdp
Table 2: Summary statistics: Central government characteristics
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Dependent Variable Collapsed Model Pooled Model Fixed Effects
Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d)
Political variables
herfgov -0.499** -0.157** -0.063 -0.323***
(0.180) (0.072) (0.060) (0.101)
election -0.108 0.011 0.012 0.019
(0.181) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
ideology -0.087 -0.011 -0.013 0.017
(0.080) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022)
district 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.014***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
contract -0.391** -0.105* -0.053 -0.218***
(0.142) (0.056) (0.047) (0.052)
Budgetary variables
def rev -0.553 -0.131 -0.143 0.010
(1.366) (0.199) (0.191) (0.207)
def rev(t−1) -0.151 -0.104 -0.320
(0.202) (0.193) (0.252)
debt gg gdp(t−1) -0.028 -0.004 -0.008 0.255**
(0.132) (0.075) (0.040) (0.124)
Timing
sgp 0.291** 0.042* 0.048** 0.053*
(0.122) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
trend 0.014*** 0.002 0.014***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
continues on next page...
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...continued from previous page
Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d)
Controls
depratio 1.721 2.410 0.599 4.941**
(2.582) (1.676) (0.984) (2.294)
outgap 0.039 -0.003 0.001 -0.012**
(0.028) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
unempl 2.599* 0.915 0.494 -0.506
(1.428) (0.564) (0.367) (0.785)
Ipopulation 0.941 1.162*** 0.483* 6.598
(0.727) (0.425) (0.253) (10.436)
edec 0.465 0.188 0.127 -0.279
(0.279) (0.160) (0.092) (0.270)
tax 0.684** 0.781*** 0.263** 1.396***
(0.283) (0.150) (0.112) (0.239)
local dummy 0.158* 0.282*** 0.093***
(0.078) (0.056) (0.034)
regional dummy 0.227*** 0.332*** 0.109***
(0.079) (0.055) (0.037)
LDV 0.648***
(0.071)
Constant -1.935 -2.735** -0.881
(1.831) (1.281) (0.739)
Fixed Effects No No No Yes
R2 0.888 0.467 0.822 0.620
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) n=41, (2)-(4) n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Model (a): aggregated estimation according to Equation 2; Models (b) and (c): pooled regression with
panel corrected standard errors; Model (d): fixed effect estimation with standard errors robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West)
Table 3: Determinants of fiscal rules
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Dependent Variable Fixed Effect Panel Model
Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Herfindahl index (fractionalization)
herfgov -0.297*** -0.301*** -0.345*** -0.279***
(0.100) (0.097) (0.103) (0.103)
herfgov ∗ federal -0.005 -0.061
(0.089) (0.090)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ federal 0.244*** 0.280***
(0.082) (0.080)
herfgov ∗ unitary -0.261 -0.182
(0.179) (0.147)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.376* -0.499***
(0.213) (0.190)
Election year
election 0.012 0.013 0.017 0.011
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
election ∗ federal 0.030 0.029
(0.022) (0.019)
election(t−1) ∗ federal 0.009 -0.006
(0.016) (0.012)
election ∗ unitary 0.002 -0.003
(0.019) (0.017)
election(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.008 -0.009
(0.021) (0.018)
Ideology (1=right-wing single party)
ideology 0.044** 0.032 0.064*** 0.022
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
ideology ∗ federal -0.049 0.021
(0.031) (0.023)
ideology(t−1) ∗ federal 0.016 -0.009
(0.025) (0.023)
ideology ∗ unitary 0.043 0.058*
(0.041) (0.032)
ideology(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.054 0.044
(0.037) (0.033)
District magnitude
district 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
district ∗ federal -0.004 0.007
(0.005) (0.006)
district(t−1) ∗ federal 0.005 0.007**
(0.004) (0.004)
district ∗ unitary 0.008* 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
district(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.002)
continues on next page...
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...continued from previous page
Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Contract
contract -0.226*** -0.219*** -0.235*** -0.220***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.053)
contract ∗ federal -0.269*** -0.273***
(0.069) (0.063)
contract(t−1) ∗ federal -0.003 0.045
(0.026) (0.029)
contract ∗ unitary -0.070 -0.074
(0.044) (0.054)
contract(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.057 -0.182**
(0.067) (0.076)
Controls
def rev -0.169 -0.119 -0.221 0.042 -0.133 -0.095
(0.188) (0.216) (0.206) (0.196) (0.213) (0.174)
def rev(t−1) -0.228 -0.274 -0.250 -0.206 -0.198 -0.265
(0.215) (0.247) (0.249) (0.239) (0.244) (0.215)
unempl -0.783 0.437 1.047 0.422 0.357 -1.081
(1.142) (1.388) (1.404) (1.424) (1.379) (1.123)
unempl(t−1) -0.227 -0.938 -1.476 -0.667 -0.883 -0.131
(0.978) (1.200) (1.249) (1.191) (1.188) (0.988)
tax 0.477* 0.607* 0.683** 0.681** 0.619* 0.500*
(0.257) (0.314) (0.303) (0.300) (0.321) (0.283)
tax(t−1) 0.927*** 1.041*** 1.053*** 1.019*** 1.030*** 0.888***
(0.289) (0.317) (0.303) (0.306) (0.319) (0.298)
depratio 4.292** 5.258** 6.523*** 6.853*** 5.091** 5.582***
(1.886) (2.177) (2.210) (2.269) (2.229) (1.929)
outgap -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
debt gg gdp 0.334*** 0.276** 0.320*** 0.234** 0.233* 0.375***
(0.099) (0.119) (0.116) (0.118) (0.121) (0.110)
Ipopulation 3.880 -1.906 -10.029 0.944 -0.481 -0.778
(9.337) (11.361) (12.072) (11.130) (11.493) (9.967)
edec -0.491* -0.430 -0.528* -0.329 -0.424 -0.500*
(0.280) (0.283) (0.299) (0.301) (0.292) (0.290)
sgp 0.042 0.047* 0.063** 0.041 0.044 0.039
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028)
trend 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.012** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.702 0.636 0.647 0.654 0.642 0.735
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Specification according to model (d) in Table 3. Fixed effect estimation with standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 4: Determinants of fiscal rules II
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Dependent Variable Fixed Effects FE IV2SLS GMM
Deficit/GDP (a) (b) (c) (d)
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) -0.013**
(0.006)
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.015 0.038** 0.009
(0.011) (0.017) (0.010)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.014**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.005)
Fiscal rules
rules -0.001
(0.002)
rules ∗ unitary -0.005** -0.013*** -0.003*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
rules ∗ federal 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Controls
def cg rev 0.007* 0.006 0.006 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
edec 0.020** 0.026*** 0.024** 0.016**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
intexp rev -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
outgap -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
unempl -0.016 -0.017 -0.025 -0.000
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016)
Ipopulation 0.805*** 1.071*** 1.140*** 0.687***
(0.252) (0.263) (0.284) (0.184)
depratio -0.086** -0.090** -0.070* -0.043
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.034)
trend 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
LDV 0.362***
(0.075)
individual/year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
R2 0.232 0.267 0.113
K-P Weak Id. F 10.01
Sargan/Hansen 12.96 228
Sargan/Hansen p-value 0.226 0.120
AR(1) p-value 0.003
AR(2) p-value 0.287
Standard errors in parentheses, see notes for details
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: All models include individual and year fixed effects. Models (a) and (b): fixed effect estimations with
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West); Model (c): fixed effect two
stage least square estimation. First stage regressions are presented in Table 10 of Appendix B. Current and
lagged values of instruments used for both types of countries; Model (d) Difference-GMM dynamic panel data
estimation with robust standard errors and transformation of forward orthogonal deviations. LDV is the lagged
dependent variable. Exogenous instruments are the same as for model (c).
Table 5: Regressions of deficits
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Dependent Variable Deficit/Revenues Deficit per capita
IV 2SLS Dynamic GMM IV 2SLS Dynamic GMM
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.334** 0.169 0.105* 0.027
(0.141) (0.113) (0.055) (0.035)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.289*** -0.174*** -0.075*** -0.026**
(0.075) (0.047) (0.026) (0.013)
Fiscal rules
rules ∗ unitary -0.102*** -0.043*** -0.034*** -0.006
(0.031) (0.017) (0.012) (0.005)
rules ∗ federal -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.002
full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
individual/year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
R2 0.147 0.125
K-P Weak Id. F 10.01 10.01
Sargan/Hansen 12.64 228 11.18 228
Sargan/Hansen J p-value 0.245 0.120 0.344 0.120
AR(1) p-value 0.002 0.003
AR(2) p-value 0.539 0.223
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Two stage least square estimations in (a) and (c) and Difference-GMM in (b) and (d). Set of control
variables as before, results not reported here but in Table 9 of Appendix B.
Table 6: Alternative dependent variables
39
NL,GR,LU
UK
DK
IE
FR
PT
FI
SE
IT
-
.
15
-
.
1
-
.
05
0
.
05
Li
ne
ar
 P
re
di
ct
io
n
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
fiscal rules index
(a) Effect of fiscal rules in unitary countries
DE regional
AT regional
AT local
BE regional
DE local
BE local
ES local
ES regional
-
.
4
-
.
3
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
Li
ne
ar
 P
re
di
ct
io
n
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
tax autonomy
(b) Effect of tax autonomy in federations
Bars: (a) value of the rules index in 2008, (b) value of tax autonomy in 2008.
Figure 5: Policy implications
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Figure 6: Marginal effects interaction terms41
A. Federal classification
The structure of European countries differs in many respects. One of the most important
distinctions is the role and status of the sub-national sector due to the constitutional structure.
federal countries Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain
(local and regional levels included separately)
unitary countries Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom
(consolidated sub-national values included)
Table 7: Unitary and federal classification
Three countries out of the EU15 are original federations as written down in the respective
constitution (Austria, Belgium, Germany), and another country (Spain) has a very regionalized
structure. All these countries have had handed over important responsibilities to the regional
and local level, and these sub-national governments have significant own legislative powers. I
treat this group of countries as federations in my analysis. The other group of states consists
of unitary countries, but those may have a different number of sub-national levels. While
Finland has only a local level sector, the remaining unitary countries (Denmark, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom)
have at least one regional level, but with limited legal autonomy, compared to their federal
counterparts. As indicated in Table 7, I group all these countries as unitary ones.
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B. Additional regression results
B.1. Results interaction model
Dependent Variable Interaction Terms
Deficit/GDP Deficit/Revenues
(a) (b)
Unitary countries
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.044*** 0.380**
(0.015) (0.156)
rules ∗ unitary -0.019*** -0.137**
(0.005) (0.050)
rules ∗ tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.010 0.051
(0.009) (0.096)
Federal countries
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.005 -0.087
(0.012) (0.092)
rules ∗ federal 0.001 0.008
(0.003) (0.027)
rules ∗ tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.030** -0.221**
(0.011) (0.096)
Controls
def cg rev 0.006 0.074*
(0.006) (0.042)
edec 0.020 0.181*
(0.013) (0.087)
intexp rev -0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.008)
outgap -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.002)
unempl -0.034* -0.148
(0.019) (0.146)
Ipopulation 1.316*** 11.074***
(0.283) (3.133)
depratio -0.076** -0.511*
(0.031) (0.294)
trend -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Constant -1.145*** -9.741***
(0.258) (2.818)
individual/year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
R2 0.312 0.289
Number of code 19 19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Results for a regression allowing for interactions between rules and tax(t−1). Marginal effects of model
(b) presented in pictures 6 (a) and (b).
Table 8: Results interaction model
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B.2. Details to Table 6
Dependent Variable Deficit/Revenues Deficit per capita
IV 2SLS Dynamic GMM IV 2SLS Dynamic GMM
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Lag
LDV 0.275*** 0.451***
(0.077) (0.070)
Controls
def cg rev 0.077** 0.058* 0.021 0.010
(0.036) (0.032) (0.014) (0.012)
edec 0.201** 0.152** 0.071** 0.039*
(0.088) (0.061) (0.034) (0.022)
intexp rev 0.002 -0.004 0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
outgap 0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
unempl -0.092 -0.000 -0.123* -0.038
(0.214) (0.161) (0.066) (0.047)
Ipopulation 9.875*** 6.869*** 2.563** 1.289***
(3.040) (2.176) (1.054) (0.500)
depratio -0.481 -0.313 -0.213* -0.109
(0.359) (0.308) (0.122) (0.082)
trend 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.000
(0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Table shows the results for control variables included in the estimations but not presented in the text
in table 6.
Table 9: Results of controls according to Table 6
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Model (c)
Equation: rules∗ unitary federal
Instruments
contract ∗ unitary -0.048 0.014
(0.055) (0.017)
contract(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.168** 0.020
(0.083) (0.014)
contract ∗ federal 0.025 -0.349***
(0.029) (0.067)
contract(t−1) ∗ federal 0.089*** -0.041***
(0.030) (0.014)
district ∗ unitary 0.006* 0.001
(0.004) (0.001)
district(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.012*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
district ∗ federal -0.006 0.009**
(0.004) (0.004)
district(t−1) ∗ federal 0.008* -0.002
(0.004) (0.003)
herfgov ∗ unitary -0.199 0.034
(0.137) (0.036)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.434** -0.020
(0.174) (0.031)
herfgov ∗ federal -0.131 0.053
(0.090) (0.049)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ federal -0.017 0.199***
(0.077) (0.064)
Other variables
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 1.649*** -0.020
(0.475) (0.084)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.419** 1.434***
(0.189) (0.135)
def cg rev -0.072 0.013
(0.125) (0.036)
edec -0.534* 0.094
(0.276) (0.095)
intexp rev 0.003 0.008
(0.031) (0.011)
outgap 0.003 0.000
(0.006) (0.002)
unempl -0.419 -0.115
(0.888) (0.196)
Ipopulation 3.934 2.780
(8.941) (4.428)
depratio 3.814** 0.303
(1.854) (0.508)
trend -0.001 0.002
(0.021) (0.007)
R2 0.608 0.763
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: First stage regressions for the results presented in table 6. The endogenous variable in the second stage
is the fiscal rules index for both types of government.
Table 10: First stage regressions to Table 6
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C. Construction of the rules index
The construction of the rules index follows the European Commission (2009). I adopt
their data-set and calculate the rules index for the sub-national sectors. The data used for
the computation of the fiscal rules index is based on a data-set provided by the European
Commission. All information is public and available online. All balanced budget rules
and debt rules applying to the sub-national sector are taken into account. All information
about the included rules are available on the web-page of the European Commission at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/fiscal_
rules/index_en.htm. Rules applying to the general government sector are weighted by the
respective sub-national expenditure share in it. The indicator is the sum of each criterion,
divided by the total number of criteria. Each criteria itself is divided by the maximum score,
i.e. all variables are forced to be between zero and one. If more than one rule applies, the
rule index is the sum of the individual values. Finally the indicator is denominated by the
maximum value in the sample, i.e. forced to vary between 0 and 1.
• Criterion 1: statutory base of the rule
The score of this criterion index is constructed as a simple average of the two elements below:
• Criterion 1a: Statutory or legal base of the rule
4 is assigned for a constitutional base
3 if the rule is based on a legal act (e.g. Public finance Act, Fiscal Responsibility Law)
2 if the rule is based on a coalition agreement or an agreement reached by different general
government tiers (and not enshrined in a legal act)
1 for political commitment by a given authority (central or local government, Minister of
Finance)
• Criterion 1b: Room for setting or revising objectives
3 if there is no margin for adjusting objectives (they are encapsulated in the document
underpinning the rule)
2 there is some but constrained margin in setting or adjusting objectives
1 there is complete freedom in setting objectives (the statutory base of the rule merely
contains broad principles or the obligation for the government or the relevant authority
to set targets)
• Criterion 2: Nature of the body in charge of monitoring respect of the rule
The score of this variable is augmented by one point in case there is a real time monitoring of
compliance with the rule (e.g. existence of alert mechanisms in case there is a risk of non-respect
of the rule).
3 if there is a monitoring by an independent authority (Fiscal Council, Court of Auditors
or any other Court) or the national Parliament
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2 monitoring by the Ministry of Finance or any other government body
1 no regular public monitoring of the rule (there is no report systematically assessing com-
pliance)
• Criterion 3: Nature of the body in charge of enforcement of the rule
3 enforcement by an independent authority (Fiscal Council or any Court) or the National
Parliament
2 enforcement by the Ministry of Finance or any other government body
1 no specific body in charge of enforcement
• Criterion 4: Enforcement mechanisms of the rule
The score of this variable is augmented by 1 point in case escape clauses are foreseen and clearly
specified.
4 there are automatic correction and sanction mechanisms in case of non-compliance
3 there is an automatic correction mechanism in case of non-compliance and the possibility
of imposing sanctions
2 the authority responsible is obliged to take corrective measures in case of non-compliance
or is obliged to present corrective proposals to Parliament or the relevant authority
1 there is no ex-ante defined actions in case of non-compliance
• Criterion 5: Media visibility of the rule
3 is assigned if the rule observance is closely monitored by the media, and if non-compliance
is likely to trigger a public debate
2 for high media interest in rule-compliance, but non-compliance is unlikely to invoke a
public debate
1 for no or modest interest of the media
D. Robustness check: federal specification
Throughout the text I used two different data points for each federal country, i.e. I included the
local and regional level as separate observations. Table 11 shows the results of two robustness
checks in order to proof whether results remain unchanged when the data is treated differently.
Model (a) repeats the previous results of model (d) in table 5 for comparison.
The next column shows a regression where I merged the local and regional government in the
four federal countries. Instead of 19 observations per year the data-set now consists out of 15,
one for each included country. However, results remain unchanged and the main conclusions
are as before.
As a last check, I estimate different coefficients for the local and regional level in federations.
That means that Φ now becomes the following:
Φ′ =

Φ1
Φ2
Φ3
 and
= 1 if unitary country, 0 otherwise
= 1 if local level in a federal country, else 0
= 1 if regional level in a federal country, else 0
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However, results (c) are in line with the previous findings. The signs and magnitude of coef-
ficients for tax(t−1) are similar for the local and regional level. Rules remain insignificant in
both cases.
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Dependent Variable IV 2SLS
Deficit/Revenues (1) (2) (3)
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.195** 0.186* 0.194**
(0.098) (0.099) (0.097)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.272*** -0.309*
(0.069) (0.180)
tax(t−1) ∗ regional -0.300***
(0.076)
tax(t−1) ∗ local -0.332*
(0.174)
Fiscal rules
rules ∗ unitary -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.056***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
rules ∗ unitary 0.002 0.032
(0.019) (0.026)
rules ∗ regional 0.021
(0.022)
rules ∗ local -0.024
(0.022)
Controls
def cg rev 0.076** 0.120*** 0.074**
(0.036) (0.039) (0.037)
edec 0.214** 0.232** 0.200**
(0.087) (0.114) (0.090)
intexp rev -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
outgap -0.000 -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unempl -0.047 -0.215 -0.059
(0.209) (0.242) (0.210)
trend 0.005 0.002 0.006
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Ipopulation 9.481*** 9.595** 9.368***
(3.050) (4.057) (3.069)
depratio -0.603* -0.668* -0.615*
(0.331) (0.392) (0.340)
R2 0.270 0.289 0.177
Number of Groups 19 15 19
Number of Observations 247 195 247
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Model (a): repetition of the estimation of model (d) in table 5 for comparison; Model (b): the local and
regional level in federal countries are merged; Model (c): individual coefficients for the regional and local level
in federal countries. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 11: Separate coefficients for local and regional governments
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